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Abstract 
Girls typically have higher grades than boys in school and recent research suggests that 
part of this gender difference may be due to discrimination of boys. We rigorously test 
this in a field experiment where a random sample of the same tests in the Swedish 
language is subject to blind and non-blind grading. The non-blind test score is on 
average 15 % lower for boys than for girls. Blind grading lowers the average grades 
with 13 %, indicating that personal ties and/or grade inflation are important in non-blind 
grading. But we find no evidence of discrimination against boys. The point estimate of 
the discrimination effect is close to zero with a 95 % confidence interval of ±4.5 % of 
the average non-blind grade. 
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2  IFAU – Are boys discriminated in Swedish high schools? 1 Introduction 
Gender differences are present both in school and in the labor market. A puzzling 
empirical regularity is that while girls outperform boys in school, they generally have 
lower wages when entering the labor market. While a large body of literature has 
studied gender differences and discrimination in the labor market, much less is known 
about the causes of gender differences among individuals before entering the labor 
market.
1 
A recent study by Lavy (2008) indicates that part of the gender difference is due to 
discrimination of male students. He used a large data set from high school in Israel and 
compared two different test scores for the same individuals: one school score based on a 
non-blind grading of a school exam by the student’s own teacher and one test score on a 
similar test graded blindly by an external examiner. He found a statistically significant 
discrimination of boys in all the examined tests. A limitation of the Lavy study is that it 
does not involve a comparison of blind and non-blind grading of the exact same tests; 
the author for instance notes that “schools are allowed to deviate from the score on the 
school exam to reflect the student’s performance on previous exams” (p. 2086). 
Moreover, the mere fact that both students and teachers know that one test is graded 
locally and the other is graded externally may affect performance on the tests. Lab 
experiments in economics suggest that subtle changes in context and framing can affect 
behavior (Levitt & List, 2007). 
Ideally we would like to compare blind and non-blind grading of the very same tests. 
In this study we carry out such a test by randomly drawing a sample of compulsory 
national tests in the Swedish high school. These tests are regraded blindly by teachers 
with no information about the student’s identity and the blind test scores are compared 
with the original non-blind test scores graded by the student’s own teachers.  
                                                 
1 See for example the OECD PISA reports from 2002, 2003 and 2006 for gender differences in different subjects and 
the recent papers by Castagnetti & Rosti (2009), Hajj & Panizza (2009), Bedard & Cho (2010), Guo et al. (2010), and 
Lai (2010). Also the historical male advantage in mathematics and science has been reduced. Campbell et al., 1999 
Jay R. Campbell, Catherine M. Hombo and John Mazzeo, Trends in Academic progress: Three decades of student 
performance, National Center for Education Statistics 2000-469 (19For an overview of gender differences in the 
labor market, see Altonji & Blank (1999).  
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Previous work by Lindahl (2007) suggests that boys might be discriminated in the 
Swedish school. She compared the non-blind test scores on national tests with the 
grades on the school leaving certificates, and found that for a given test score on the 
national test, female students obtained higher grades than male students on the school 
leaving certificate.
2 However, the national test score is only one input for the final 
grades on the school leaving certificates, and girls may have outperformed boys in other 
tasks.
3 To credibly attribute inequality to discrimination, it is imperative that the 
variation being examined is not due to differences in the skills being tested. Our strategy 
to study the same tests twice using the variation between blind and non-blind grading, 
fulfills this criterion. 
Our study is important to a wider audience for several reasons. Firstly, it is important 
to test if we can confirm the Lavy (2008) result that boys are discriminated against 
using an even more rigorous methodology (i.e. using the exact same test for both the 
blind and the non-blind grading). Secondly, given the importance of gender equality it is 
fundamental to obtain more well-controlled empirical evidence on the occurrence of 
gender discrimination in different settings and countries. Thirdly, to compare blind and 
non-blind grading is important to decide whether it is motivated with policies to grade 
exams blindly. Currently these policies differ between countries. 
In line with previous work we find a substantial gender gap in the non-blind test 
scores; the non-blind test scores are on average 15 % lower for boys than for girls. We 
furthermore find that blind grading substantially lowers the grades; on average the blind 
grades are 13 % lower than the non-blind grades. This is consistent with personal ties 
between teachers and students affecting the grading and/or grade inflation, i.e. a 
tendency to increase grades to attract students to the school. However, even though the 
blind grading substantially lowers the grades, it does not affect the gender difference in 
grades. The point estimate of the discrimination effect is close to zero with a 95 % 
confidence interval of ±4.5 % of the average grade. 
                                                 
2 Moreover, a number of studies have investigated if the effect is related to the gender of the teacher and the 
gender/ethnic congruence between student and teacher, e.g. Dee (2005). However, Holmlund & Sund (2008) find no 
such effects using data on Swedish school leaving certificates. 
3 There is no formal relation between the test score on a national test and the final grade in the subject, which makes a 
comparison between the two types of grades difficult to use for investigating discrimination. 
4  IFAU – Are boys discriminated in Swedish high schools? In the next section we describe the Swedish high school system and our data 
collection in more detail. In section 3 we discuss our empirical strategy. The results are 
presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2  The design of the study 
2.1  The Swedish high school system 
After nine years of compulsory schooling, the vast majority of the Swedish youth enroll 
in high school education. High school lasts for three years and can be either vocational 
training or on an academic track. Both the academic track and the vocational programs 
offer the same set of core subjects, comprising Swedish, English, math, and social 
studies. Basic courses in the core subjects are compulsory and, upon completion, the 
student earns basic eligibility for college education.
4 In addition to the core subjects, 
students on the academic track complete advanced courses in either math/science or 
humanities/social studies. Students in vocational programs specialize in their field, e.g. 
cooking, construction and automobile mechanics. 
Students’ achievements in different subjects are graded on a four-tiered scale: Fail, 
Pass, Pass with Distinction and Excellent. To calculate a grade point average (GPA), the 
grades are translated into a cardinal scale with 0 for Fail, 10 for Pass, 15 for Pass with 
Distinction and 20 for Excellent. Grades are absolute and the core subjects have 
nationally stipulated prerequisites for each grade. The prerequisites are exclusively 
based on knowledge criteria. Hence, conditional on the level of knowledge, grades must 
not reflect participation, diligence or ambition. In practice however, teachers enjoy great 
discretion when setting grades. Grades are not externally evaluated, so teachers could 
base their grades on anything they observe. 
Compulsory national tests are given in the core parts of Swedish, English and math. 
Since, students should be evaluated according to absolute criteria in their final grades in 
each subject, the test aims at helping the teachers to measure some of the knowledge 
                                                 
4  Some college educations, e.g. medical schools and college programs aiming at a degree in engineering, have 
additional requirements, such as completed high school courses in science and/or advanced math. 
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criteria that should determine the final grade. The final grade will be important when 
applying to universities after completion of high school. However, there is no formal 
relation between the national test and the final grade in the subject and there is indeed 
substantial variation proving the fact that the test is only one of the determinants for the 
final grade in the subject.
5 Thus, if the knowledge level is observed independently of the 
national test, the national test score could be completely ignored by the teacher when 
setting the final grade. We focus on the test in Swedish, since we posit that grading a 
Swedish test allows for more arbitrariness than, for example, math. Every academic 
year, two national tests in Swedish are constructed by the National Agency of Education 
in conjunction with the Department of Scandinavian Languages at Uppsala University. 
The tests have three parts, one oral and two written. We use data from the second, more 
extensive, written test for the academic year 2005/2006. In this test, students are asked 
to write an essay based on one out of nine topics within a common theme.
6 Students 
choose their topic with full discretion.  
The written part of the national test is graded on the same scale as the subjects. 
Teachers are given written guidelines stating the prerequisites for each grade, but have 
great discretion in the actual grading. Moreover, the teachers grade their own students. 
No means are taken by the national authorities to ensure that the guidelines are 
followed, and no evaluations of the schools are conducted.
7 
In terms of gender differences, the Ministry of Education in 2004 showed that girls 
outperform boys in most subjects at all education levels in the Swedish school system 
(Ministry of Education 2004). The overall GPA was 10 % lower for boys and 7 % more 
boys did not earn pass in the 9th grade. The gender difference was less distinct in 
mathematics and science than in languages and religion. These differences are also 
confirmed in the yearly national tests (Swedish National Agency for Education, 2006; 
Lindahl, 2007). Historically the gender gap has increased in subjects such as languages 
and religion, while advantages for boys in math and science have turned into a 
disadvantage. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Lindahl (2007). 
6 We use the fall test of 2005 and the spring test of 2006. The themes were “Leva Livet” (Live Your Life) and “Hur 
mår du?” (How are you?), respectively. 
6  IFAU – Are boys discriminated in Swedish high schools? 2.2  Data collection and sampling procedure 
The Swedish school system directly provides us with one of the components needed, the 
non-blind grade. To obtain blind test scores, we drew a random sample of 2880 students 
from 100 schools eligible to take the test.
8 Out of the 2880 students in the sample, we 
received complete information, which is the actual test, the test score and the student’s 
identity, for 1713 students.
9 Absenteeism is the main cause for not taking the test, but 
tests were also missing due to inferior administrative routines at the schools. Out of the 
96 participating schools, not all schools had proper filing procedures in line with the 
guidelines of the National Agency of Education. In the end, 94 schools were able to 
deliver the required material. 
We had all tests rewritten on a word processor and the student identities as well as 
their teachers’ notes were deleted. We did this to ensure that the re-graders would not be 
able to identify the students’ gender or be influenced by the non-blind grade. Naturally, 
nothing else was changed. 
As a final step, we selected about 35-50 tests into groups and hired 42 teachers from 
a teachers’ agency to re-grade one group each.
10 The re-grading teachers did not know 
which student’s test they regraded and they had no information regarding the purpose of 
the study. The teachers were provided the official written guidelines stating the 
prerequisites for each grade and topic. 
                                                                                                                                               
7 In 2010, the Swedish government launched a first evaluation in order to ensure objectivity of grading. 
8 Being eligible means that a student attends a class that is participating in the course Swedish B. To perform the 
random sample, we obtained a complete list of all 467 Swedish public high schools for 2005/06 and the schools 
enrollment data from the National Agency of Education. Based on this data, we used a two-step procedure to ensure 
that each student is equally likely to end up in our sample. In the first step, we weighted all schools by the number of 
enrolled students in the final year 2005/06. We then chose 100 schools, where the probability of each school being 
chosen corresponds to its weight in the population. Since Swedish public high schools are subject to a law requiring 
that documents produced at the schools should be made available to anyone asking for them, we phoned these 100 
schools and asked for the classes that took the test either in the fall of 2005 or the spring of 2006. Out of 100 schools 
we were able to establish contact with 96. After receiving the lists of students in each class, we randomly drew 30 
students from each school. Using this procedure, we thus ended up with a sample of 2880 students where all students 
in the population had the same probability of being sampled. 
9  The National Agency of Education requires that all tests and test results should be properly filed and also handed 
out to any citizen according to the Swedish constitution. As compared to the statistics from the yearly collection of 
test scores, not tests, that Statistics Sweden does for 200 representative High Schools, we have approximately the 
same success. For Swedish B, their total response rate for 2006 was about 62%, as compared to 59% in this study. 
Moreover, we did receive about 100 more tests but either the grade was lost, or the wrong test was submitted. 
According to National Agency of Education, about 10% of the missing values are due to administrative causes. The 
rest is due to the fact that eligible students are absent.  
See: www.skolverket.se/content/1/c4/20/08/kursprovrapport%20vt06.pdf 
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Since there were only a few characteristics that could be used to match the re-grader 
with the Swedish population of teachers, we required re-graders to have been grading 
national tests in Swedish before. With a slight majority of female teachers in Swedish 
high schools, we also required the share of female teachers to be 50-60 %. Moreover, 
we required that 75 % of the teachers were certified in order to match the corresponding 
national share. Out of the 42 regrading teachers, 81 % were certified, 52 % were female, 
and 88 % were born in Sweden. Moreover, the re-grading teachers had 7.8 years of 
teaching experience, were born 1969 on average and were located all over Sweden.
11 
3  The empirical estimation approach 
Let a non-blind (NB) test score be determined by student i:s ability in a broad sense, the 
examiner’s potential prejudice of gender and an error term. Assume it to be linearly 
related as 
  = ++ + iNB NB i i iNB Testscore ability Male u α δβ , (1) 
where Male  is an indicator taking the value of 1 if student i is a boy and 0 otherwise. 
We define gender discrimination as gender differences in the test results conditional on 
ability. To put it differently: If grades are not discriminatory, then two students of 
different gender producing the same quality of the test should get the same grade.
12 If 
not, one of them is discriminated. Thus, we could interpret β  as a discrimination effect. 
If negative, then boys are discriminated and if positive, girls are discriminated. The 
classical problem with this formulation is that we do not observe ability. If ability is 
correlated with gender, e.g. if female students of school age are more mature or for 
some reason study harder, then estimating this equation without conditioning on ability 
would bias β  downwards and we could falsely conclude that boys are discriminated, 
when in fact female students are more able. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
10 The agency is represented all over Sweden and was established 1999.  
11 The oldest was born in 1953 and the youngest in 1983. 
12 We think it is appropriate to use the label “discrimination” here. According to the written guidelines the teacher 
should only grade the test according to the quality of the test, and nothing else. However, it is possible that a 
discrimination effect could be due to discrimination with respect to some unobserved characteristic that is correlated 
with gender. But even if this is the case, it would still result in discrimination. It is very difficult to separate such 
8  IFAU – Are boys discriminated in Swedish high schools? Given our set up of the study, this endogeneity problem can be taken care of. 
Consider an examiner that has no information about gender (B for ‘blind’). Then, we 
simply have  0 = β  and  
  = + iB B i iB Testscore ability u + α δ . (2) 
The difference between (1) and (2) yields the standard difference-in-difference 
formulation where ability is differenced away and β  measures the pure discrimination 
effect as:  
  Δ= + i Testscore Male u + i i α β  (3) 
where  iB iNB i Testscore Testscore Testscore − = Δ , ) ( B NB α α α − = and  .  iB iNB i u u u − =
It is worth noticing that an explicit assumption is that δ carries no subscript, i.e. 
ability is assumed to affect the non-blind and blind test score in the same way. We argue 
that there is no reason for ability to systematically affect the test score differently in the 
two equations, given that grading is based on absolute knowledge criteria and that both 
the teachers and the re-graders were given the very same detailed instructions for 
grading the test. 
Our discrimination estimate could still be biased through selection. However, only 6 
out of 100 schools did not respond or submitted no information on tests which makes 
selection very unlikely to be problematic at the school level. For students being absent 
on the test to create a problem, we need their potential difference in test scores to be 
related to gender. It is not a problem for our identification strategy that this group would 
perform differently from the students taking the test. 
Apart from the discrimination effect we also want to estimate the effect of blind 
grading per se. Hence, we choose to use the interaction formulation of the difference-in-
difference model as our baseline model: 
  ( ) * =+ + + + ij i j j i ij Testscore Male NB NB Male α γλ β ε  (4) 
where j denotes either blind or non blind grading. The coefficient γ  measures the extent 
to which girls are outperforming boys. Note that γ , in contrast toβ , could be biased 
                                                                                                                                               
indirect discrimination from direct discrimination due to preferences. Since other studies use the label discrimination 
when facing the same methodological problem we stick to that convention here (see Altonji & Blank, 1999). 
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because of absenteeism. For example, assume boys are poorer than girls (γ <0). If the 
worst students (more boys) are absent, then we would underestimate γ  in absolute 
terms. We will therefore also add control variables to equation (4) to test the robustness 
of our estimate ofγ . Since NB is an indicator with values 1 if the test was graded non 
blind and 0 otherwise, λ  is our measure of the inflation caused by non-blind grading. 
β  has the same interpretation as before.  
To test the robustness of the discrimination effect (β ) by adding individual invariant 
covariates such as school fixed effects and year of birth, we will use equation (3) instead 
of equation (4), as equation (4) saturates all these effects. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive  results 
Out of the 2880 students, we are able to determine gender of 2861 by either the second 
last digit in the social security number or first name. However, due to absenteeism or 
substandard administrative routines at the schools, we only have 1713 observations 
were  both the blind and the non blind test score is recorded. Figure 1 depicts the 
distributions of the blind and non-blind test scores for these observations. In the Figure, 
we clearly see that female students have higher grades than male students in both the 
non-blind test score and the blind test score. There is also a clear tendency of an overall 
down-grading for both genders in the blind grading. 
Moreover, Figure 2 measures the difference between non-blind and blind test scores. 
The blind and non-blind test scores are identical for about 50 % of the students, whereas 
the scores differ for the remaining students. The most noteworthy difference is that 5 
female students received the highest grades in the non-blind procedure, while they 
received the lowest grade when graded blindly. 








































Figure 1 The distribution of test scores for the non-blind and the blind grading 
procedures 



















Difference between  non-blind and blind test score
Graphs by gender
 
Figure 2 The distribution of the difference in test scores for the non-blind and blind 
grading procedures 
 
Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the 1713 complete observations.
13 We also 
report the significance levels for the difference between non-blind and blind test scores 
and for the difference-in-difference measuring the discrimination effect.
14 In line with 
previous studies, female students on average get higher grades than male students. The 
average non-blind test score is 15 % lower for boys than for girls in our data, and this 
difference is highly significant. Blind grading significantly decreases the average score 
by 13 %, consistent with grade inflation. However, this decrease is of a similar 
magnitude for both boys and girls, and the difference between the blind and the non-
blind test score is almost identical for boys and girls. We thus find no evidence of 
discrimination. To further test the significance and robustness of the results we turn to 
the regression analysis results. 
                                                 
13 In this table and in the rest of the paper, we use the cardinal scale used by the national authorities to calculate 
GPAs, i.e. 0, 10, 15, 20 for Fail, Pass, Pass with Distinction and Excellent. 
14 The p-values are reported both with a parametric test (an independent samples t-test for between subjects 
comparisons and a paired t-test for the within subjects comparisons) and a non-parametric test (the Mann-Whitney 
test for between subjects comparisons and the Wilcoxon test for within subjects comparisons). 
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Table 1 Test scores and differences in test scores 
Sample statistics  N  Mean  Std. Dev 
Non-blind test score  1713  11.97607  4.999183 
Blind test score  1713  10.4495  5.484892 
Difference  
p-value of diff. (paired t-test) 





      
Non-blind test score, boys  858  11.00816  5.072743 
Non-blind test score, girls  855  12.94737  4.732002 
Difference 
p-value of diff. (t-test) 





      
Blind test score, boys  858  9.481352  5.591522 
Blind test score, girls  855    11.42105   5.200705 
Difference 
p-value of diff. (t-test) 





      
Non-blind test - Blind test score, boys  858  1.526807  5.906692 
Non-blind test - Blind test score, girls  855    1.526316  5.526512 
Difference 
p-value of diff. (t-test) 





Note: We report data on the test scores where we have observations on both the blind and the non blind test score. 
4.2 Regression  results 
Table 2 presents the results from the estimation of the regression equation (4).
  The 
main variable of interest, the interaction between the male and the non-blind indicator, 
measures the potential discrimination. The point estimate in the base-line estimation in 
the first column in the Table is close to zero; the interpretation of the point estimate of 
0.0004907 is that girls get about a .0005 lower non-blind test score on average due to 
their gender. The sign of this point estimate is not consistent with our hypothesis of 
discrimination of boys, but the estimate is very far from significant. Taken at face value, 
it suggests a discrimination effect of less than 0.005 % of the average non-blind test 
score. Making use of a standard 95 % confidence interval the confidence interval for the 
discrimination effect is ±4.5 % of the average non-blind grade. We conclude that there 
is no evidence in favor of discrimination of either boys or girls. 
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Table 2 Regression results on the effect of gender discrimination on the non-blind test 
score and robustness of the male indicator variable 































Regrader fixed effect  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School fixed effect
  No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Re-writer fixed effect
  No No  No  Yes  Yes 
Student year of birth
  No No  No  No  Yes 
N
  3426 3426  3426  3426  3314 
R
2  .0542 .1103  .2005  .2005  .2131 
Note: A constant is always included. Two-way clustered standard errors reported in parentheses at the school and re-
grader level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) and Thompson (2009)). 
 
The other estimates in column 1 show that boys perform worse and that blind grading is 
associated with lower grades for both genders. The highly significant point estimate of -
1.93 on the Male indicator means that the non-blind test score is 15 % lower for boys 
than for girls, controlling for discrimination. The estimate of 1.53 on the variable Non-
blind test is also highly significant and means that the blind test score is on average 
13 % lower than the non-blind test score. As can be expected, these results are very 
similar to the comparisons of mean differences in Table 1.
15  
In order to check for robustness of the estimate of γ  we add fixed effects for the re-
grading teacher, the schools, the rewriter (that rewrote the tests on a word processor) 
and controls for student’s year of birth.
16 The estimate is very robust to the inclusion of 
these control variables. Note that the coefficients of discrimination and the non-blind 
test will not change in these additional estimations, by definition, since equation (4) 
saturates all these effects. The change of estimates in column 5 is only due to 56 
                                                 
15 A difference in difference estimator as in equation (3) or equation (4) is mathematically equivalent to the difference 
of the difference of group means as reported in Table 1. 
16  Most of the students were born in the year 1987 (84%). Another 14 % were born in either 1986 or 1988. We lack 
data for 56 students. We also have month of birth for a smaller sub-sample. However, nothing substantial changes 
when adding it as a control. 
14  IFAU – Are boys discriminated in Swedish high schools? missing observations on student year of birth. Reassuringly, the discrimination estimate 
is not substantially different in this sub-sample. 
If the randomization was improper, then we could simply capture compositional 
effects. E.g. some schools have a conservative grading policy and if randomization 
failed then we might have disproportionably many boys or girls in these schools. The 
same argument holds for the reassessing teacher being conservative, and for the 
rewriting procedure and the age of student. This can be tested for by adding fixed 
effects for schools, re-grading teacher and rewriter and the year of birth of the student. 
However, as pointed out before, it is easier to use equation (3) for this purpose, since we 
are mainly interested in sensitiveness of the coefficient of discrimination. Note also that  
by adding controls to equation (3) we also allow for different schools or older students 
to have greater or smaller impact on the difference in grades, in addition to potential 
efficiency enhancements. Column 1-4 in Table 3 presents the results. The coefficient is 
robust and randomization seems to have worked properly and the main conclusion from   
Table 2 holds.  
In general, a major concern with any non-blind/blind set up is that the blind assessor 
also can observe the variable that is supposed to be non-observable (gender in this 
study). It is reasonable that some students reveal their gender in their texts. This means a 
bias towards zero of the discrimination effect. With a larger number of observations, we 
could thus find a lower bound of the discrimination effect. It is reasonable that choosing 
some topics to write about could be correlated with the easiness of identify the gender 
of a student in the blind setting. For example, if the student write about alcohol (one of 
the 18 topics), then possibly gender could more easily be deduced since alcohol 
consumption differs across gender.  
That some topics might carry a gender signal to the re-grader does not necessarily 
create a bias. For example, assume boys are discriminated in the non-blind setting. Then 
if a boy chooses a boyish subject then he will get the same grade from the re-grader, 
holding other determinants constant. But at the same time the girl that choose the boyish 
topic will be treated as a boy and get a decreased grade, leaving the coefficient on 
discrimination unchanged in a difference in difference set up if the proportion of girls 
and boys is representative. 
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Table 3 Robustness of the discrimination effect 











Regrader  fixed  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effect
  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Re-writer fixed effect
  No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student year of birth
  No No No  Yes  Yes 
Topic fixed effect  No  No  No  No  Yes 
N
  1713 1713 1713 1657 1657 
R
2  0.0958 0.2099 0.2188 0.2195 0.2335 
Note: A constant is always included. Two-way clustered standard errors reported in parentheses at the school and re-
grader level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) and Thompson (2009)). 
 
To put it differently, controlling for the proportion of boys or girls in each topic would 
take care of this problem. Figure 3 shows that there are significant differences in the 
proportion of boys across topics. The most extreme topics a’ priory also seem to attract 
girls or boys disproportional. Except for the topic on alcohol there is one topic on 
beauty, one on cellular phones, indicated in Figure 3 that shows clear gender marks.  
However, if the choice of topic will affect the probability to discover the gender of 
students with certainty, then we need each topic to have its own intercept. Thus, 
including a fixed effect for the choice of topic, should serve as a reasonable robustness 
check for both the two problems. As discussed before, the students choose 1 out of 9 
topics each time a test take place.
17 In column 5 a topic fixed effect for topics is added, 
and even though the coefficient changes somewhat, the previous conclusion still 
remain.
18 
                                                 
17 Since we have two rounds of test we observe 18 topics. Moreover, some students have failed to indicate topic 
chosen, which means we have another category of unknown topics. 
18 Note that given missing observation on some students year of birth, the estimate in column 5 in Table 3 should 
have the discrimination effect in column 5 in Table 2 as a benchmark. 





























































































































































































































































































































Figure 3 Proportion of boys for every topic 
 
In general, a major concern with any non-blind/blind set up is that the blind assessor 
also can observe the variable that is supposed to be non-observable (gender in this 
study). It is possible that the re-grading teachers may be able to guess the gender of the 
student based on the text of the test. This could lead to a downward bias in our 
estimated discrimination effect. As the students choose among different topics, the 
choice of topic may reveal some information about gender. Figure 3 shows the fraction 
of boys in each topic and as can be seen in the graph this fraction varies between about 
25 % and 70 % in the different topics. The topic “beauty” is least popular among boys 
and the topic “alcohol and health” is most popular. To control for the topic we add fixed 
effects for the topics in the final column in Table 3.
19 This has little effect on the results 
and the point estimate of the discrimination effect is still close to zero.
20 
                                                 
19 Since we have data from two rounds of the test we observe 18 topics. Moreover, as some students failed to indicate 
the chosen topic, we added a category for unknown topics (the Misc. category in Figure 3). 
20 Note that given the missing observation on some student’s year of birth, the estimate in column 5 in Table 3 should 
have the discrimination effect in column 5 in Table 2 as a benchmark. 
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4.3 Extensions 
As explained in section 2 students in the Swedish high school system can chose 
between two types of high school programs: academic track or vocational training. It is 
possible that the discrimination effect could differ between these two sub-groups. We 
therefore, as a further robustness check, estimate our results separately for academic 
track and vocational training students using equation (3).
21 The results are presented in 
Table 4. The point estimate goes in the direction of male discrimination in the academic 
track and female discrimination in the vocational track, but both effects are far from 
significant. Moreover, the point estimate of discrimination in the academic track is 
decreased by more than 50 % when adding the full set of controls. We also test if the 
coefficient of the discrimination variable differs significantly between the two groups, 
but this difference is also far from significant.
22   
Our dependent variable is not continuous as we only observe four possible grades: 0, 
10, 15 and 20. However, in the OLS regressions it is treated as a continuous variable. 
To test the importance of this assumption we also estimate an interval regression (also 
known as grouped data regression) using equation (4) with maximum likelihood (Long 
& Freese, 2006). The drawback of implementing this model is that we do not know the 
exact bounds of the intervals, but in the estimation below we put the bounds at the 
midpoint between each of the grades.
23 The interval regression results for the estimate 
of discrimination effect are shown in the last column in Table 4. Although the sign of 
the discrimination coefficient shifts from positive to negative, the estimated effect is 
still close to zero and far from significant.
24 
                                                 
21 We have not been able to get information on vocational and academic tracks for the full sample. Thus, we miss 
some observations. The share of girls on academic track is 50.5% and the share in vocational training is 49.5 %. 
22 The p-value of a z-test of the difference in the discrimination coefficient between equation 1 and 3 in Table 4 is 
0.272 and the p-value of a z-test of the difference between equation 2 and 4 in Table 4 is 0.407. 
23 The four grades are thus divided into the following four intervals: <5, 5-12.5, 12.5-17.5, >17.5. 
24 The male indicator variable in the interval regression is - 2.00 compared to -1.93 in the OLS regression, and the 
coefficient of the Non-blind test variable is 1.64 in the interval regression compared to 1.53 in the OLS.  
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Table 4 Extensions 
Variables  1  2  3  4    5 










(.4567069  ) 
.5058355 
(.529908) 
-.1105371   
(.2886335) 
Full sets of controls
  No Yes  No  Yes  No 
N
  791 770  694  672  3426 
R
2  0.0004 0.3759  0.0013  0.3664   
Notes: A constant is always included. Two-way clustered standard errors reported in parentheses at the 
school and re-grader level (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) and Thompson (2009)) in column 1-4. 
STATA does not support two-way clustered standard errors for interval regressions and we present 
standard errors clustered at the school level in column 5. Clustering at the re-grader level gives somewhat 
lower standard errors. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Our study contributes to the increasing literature testing for discrimination in economics 
(Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; Ladd, 1998; Szymanski, 2000; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2004). We failed to find any evidence of discrimination of boys in the Swedish high 
school. Our point estimate is very close to zero with a relatively narrow confidence 
interval. So we cannot confirm the results of Lavy (2008) for high school students in 
Israel. This could either be because there is discrimination in Israel but not in Sweden or 
because the difference between the school scores and the national scores studied by 
Lavy is due to other factors than discrimination. Further work is needed to differentiate 
between these two explanations. It should also be emphasized that we only test for 
discrimination in one subject/test (Swedish) and it cannot be ruled out that there is 
discrimination in other subjects in the Swedish high school. We also cannot rule out 
small effects of discrimination that are within our estimated confidence interval.  
Our results suggest that comparing the grades between national tests and the school 
leaving certificates as done by for instance Lindahl (2007) is not a valid method to 
detect discrimination. Instead it is necessary to compare blind and non-blind grading on 
the exact same test as done in the present study. It would be relatively simple for the 
responsible national authorities to generate such data on a large scale by routinely using 
blind grading on a sample of the national tests in addition to the standard grading by the 
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student’s own teachers. Such data would be a valuable source for continuously testing 
and monitoring for discrimination in grading. Implementing a system of blind grading 
on the national tests would also be one way of ensuring against discrimination as well as 
grade inflation on the tests. But even if the national tests are graded blindly, there is still 
scope for grade inflation and discrimination in the final subject grades as these are not 
only based on the national tests. 
According to our results blind grading leads to substantially lower grades than non-
blind grading, i.e. there is a tendency for teachers to give their own student’s a too high 
grade. It is likely that this tendency can depend on the incentives for teachers and the 
competition between schools (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). In Sweden a system of 
competition between high schools for students was relatively recently implemented, and 
concerns have been raised about grade inflation due to this system (Wikström & 
Wikström, 2005). By giving higher grades, which are important for university 
admission, high schools can attract better and more students. The personal ties between 
students and their teachers may also in itself put an upward pressure on grades. 
It has been seen in many studies that girls outperform boys at school and our data 
confirms this. To continue studying the sources of this gender gap is important. As this 
difference does not appear to be due to discrimination and is unlikely to depend on 
innate differences in ability (Feingold, 1988; Hyde et al., 1990, 2008; Guiso et al., 
2008), the most plausible explanation is that girls provide more effort in school. To 
investigate why this is the case and to what extent it varies with different learning 
environments is crucial for the design of policies aimed at decreasing the gender gap in 
school. 
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